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Current drug policy in the U.S. military mandates frequent 
random drug testing of service members and dismissal of 
those who test positive for illegal drugs.  This paper analyzes 
the economic costs and benefits of this zero tolerance policy 
as applied in the U.S. Navy.  Program effects consist of the 
actual number of detected users and the predicted number of 
deterred potential users.  Productivity losses imposed by drug 
users are based on reported annual workdays lost due to drug 
use in the Navy.  The productivity losses avoided by deterring 
and detecting users constitute program benefits.  Program 
costs include the cost of replacing service members who are 
dismissed under the zero tolerance policy.  Net benefits are 
sensitive to three key parameters -- the deterrence effect, 
replacement cost, and productivity losses due to drug use.  
The results show that net benefits are negative for most 
plausible values of the key parameters. 
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Workplace Drug Prevention Programs: Does Zero Tolerance Work? 
 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
 
 The number of firms and government agencies in the U.S. adopting programs to 
combat substance abuse in the workplace has increased steadily over time.  The 
percentage of medium- to large-sized U.S. firms using some form of drug testing nearly 
doubled in the 1990’s following passage of the Drug Free Workplace Act of 1988, which 
requires companies with federal contracts to make appropriate efforts to maintain a drug-
free workplace (Hartwell et al. 1996). 1   The types of testing programs vary considerably: 
some organizations require tests of job applicants, others impose ‘probable cause’ tests, 
and still others, especially those in the utility and transportation sectors, require periodic 
or random testing of all employees. 2  A small number of employers, most notably the 
military, have implemented a zero tolerance policy that combines aggressive drug testing 
with dismissal or prosecution of drug-positive workers.  Despite the widespread use of 
drug testing and other workplace interventions, and the legal controversies surrounding 
them (Lieberwitz, 1994), there is scant research on the effects of these programs or their 
efficiency. 
This paper explores the economic costs and benefits of a particularly aggressive 
workplace drug prevention program that has existed in the U.S. military since 1981 (Bray 
et al. 1992).  The military mandates regular random drug testing of current service 
members and imposes severe penalties on those who test positive for drugs.  Penalties 
range from dismissal, which may bar the individual from future government employment 
and from collecting veterans’ benefits, to court martial, which carries jail time or fines.   
Despite the popularity of the zero tolerance concept, the welfare gains or losses of such 
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programs have not been evaluated in the literature.  The military’s drug policies offer a 
unique natural experiment for studying a zero tolerance policy.      
 The goal of a punitive policy such as zero tolerance is to increase the probability 
of detection of current drug users and to impose sanctions to deter potential drug users.  
Economic benefits of the program depend on the size of the deterrence and detection 
effects.  To assess the size of the deterrence effect empirically we estimate annual 
differences in illicit drug use between military and civilian workers based on data from 
the National Household Survey of Drug Abuse (NHSDA) and the U.S. Defense 
Department’s Worldwide Health Survey. To assess the detection effect we obtain data on 
the actual number of users detected in the Navy for a given year.  We use estimates of 
work time lost due to drug use to monetize the benefits associated with deterrence and 
detection.  Because of the assumptions necessary to calculate program benefits and costs, 
we conduct a sensitivity analysis of the robustness of annual net benefit estimates.  
Although the analysis relies on data from the Navy’s program, the results should be 
representative of effects across the military.   
 This paper is structured in the following way.  Section II describes the statistical 
methodology for estimating the deterrence effect while Section III monetizes the benefits 
of detecting and deterring drug users.  Section IV describes the costs of the zero tolerance 
policy and Section V analyzes the sensitivity of annual costs and benefits to alternate 
assumptions.  Section VI concludes that, for plausible values of the key parameters, 
annual net benefits of the zero tolerance/testing policy are negative. 
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II. ESTIMATES OF THE DETERRENCE EFFECT 
 Illicit drug use among active duty personnel dropped steadily following 
implementation of the military's strict intervention program in 1981.  Military drug 
prevalence rates fell from 27.6 percent in 1980 just prior to introduction of the drug 
program, to 8.9 percent in 1985 shortly after implementation, to 3.4 percent in 1992 
(Bray and Marsden, 1995).  Although the reduction in drug use in the armed forces 
appears to have been associated with the drug program, data from the NHSDA show that 
civilian prevalence rates also declined during this period.  Hence, it is not known what 
portion of the drop in military drug use is due to the program and what portion is 
explained by reductions in drug consumption among the general civilian youth 
population.   
 Goldberg et al. (2003) is one of the few prior studies to statistically assess the 
deterrence effect of a drug testing program.  The authors compare self-reported pre- and 
post-treatment drug use rates of student athletes in two Oregon high schools, one that 
tested athletes and one that did not.  Comparing the pre- and post-test differences in drug 
use in the tested and non-tested groups, the authors find a significant deterrence effect of 
15 percentage points.  Note that the high school drug program differs sharply from the 
military program in that the penalties are far less severe – drug-positive athletes are 
referred to their parents and allowed to remain on their high school athletic teams. 
 Estimates of the deterrence effect in this paper are based on the difference in drug 
use between the military and civilian sectors.  To analyze drug use in the civilian 
population we use data from the NHSDA.  In addition to collecting socioeconomic and 
demographic information, the NHSDA asks a series of questions pertaining to lifetime, 
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past-year, and past-month non-medical use of 11 or more illicit substances including 
marijuana, cocaine, crack, inhalants, hallucinogens, PCP, heroin, stimulants, sedatives, 
tranquilizers, and analgesics (SAMHSA, 1996). 
 Drug prevalence rates among active duty military personnel are derived from the 
Defense Department Worldwide Health Survey (DHS).  Questions that pertain to illicit 
drug use in the DHS are structured the same as those in the NHSDA (Bray et al., 1992).  
In addition, a number of standard demographic measures are available in both surveys.  A 
binary indicator of each respondent’s drug participation is based on positive responses to 
questions on the non-medical use of one or more of 11 illegal substances in the past 12 
months. 
  One method of analyzing the impact of the policy change on drug use is the 
difference-in-difference framework.  This approach involves comparing the change in 
behavior in the military sector, where the zero tolerance ‘treatment’ was implemented, 
with the change in behavior in the civilian sector, where drug testing is less extensive or 
absent and where zero tolerance policies are rare.  The greater certainty and severity of 
punishment in the military should increase the cost of using drugs to service members 
and reduce drug prevalence rates in the military relative to the civilian workforce.3   
Difference-in-differences estimates are obtained by merging data from the 
NHSDA and DHS surveys and analyzing military-civilian drug use differences in pre- 
and post-program years.  We estimate pre-program military-civilian differences using 
merged data from the 1980 DHS and the 1979 NHSDA surveys.  For the pre-program 
period we were forced to merge two different years as the DHS and NHSDA surveys 
were not fielded in the same years.   We chose 1979/1980 because these years 
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immediately preceded the introduction of the military’s program and also because they 
represent years in which the national trend in drug use remained unchanged.4  We chose 
1995 for the post-program year in part because military drug policies underwent 
significant revisions during the 1980’s and early 1990’s, both within the individual 
services and across the Department of Defense (DOD).5  The choice of 1995 data allows 
time for drug policies to become standardized among and within the military branches 
and thus for a more reliable evaluation of the policy’s long-run impact on drug behavior. 
The NHSDA samples were restricted to 17- to 49-year olds males to align the age 
and gender distribution of the civilian and military samples.  Since military drug test 
results indicate that 99 percent of drug usage occurs among enlisted personnel, the DHS 
samples include only enlisted personnel.  Finally, since most enlisted personnel work in 
blue-collar occupations, the NHSDA comparison group includes only in blue-collar 
workers. 
Table 1 presents the means of the variables in the data set divided into the military 
and civilian sectors, before and after the policy change.  As the first two rows show, the 
policy change was associated with a significant decrease in military drug use.  Although 
drug use also declined in the civilian sector, it fell much faster in the military: past month 
use fell by 90% in the military but by only 60% in the civilian sector; similarly, past-year 
use fell by 84% in the military but by only 54% in the civilian sector. 
          Difference-in-difference estimates are derived from a linear probability model of 
the following form: 
          DRUGi = β0 + β1 MIL + β2 YEAR95 + β3 MIL x YEAR95 + β4 Xi + ei             (1) 
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where DRUG i  is a dummy for drug use by person i, MIL is an indicator for a military 
service member, YEAR95 is an indicator of whether the year is after the policy change, 
and X i  is a set of covariates for person i (age, marital status, education, gender, 
race/ethnicity).  In this framework, the coefficient of β3 measures the effect of being in 
the military, relative to being in the civilian sector, after the zero tolerance policy, relative 
to before.  That is, the coefficient of the military-year interaction measures the change in 
drug behavior of personnel who work under a zero tolerance policy versus the change for 
civilians who are not subject to equally punitive policies.  The results are presented in 
Table 2. 
          The results for the control variables in Table 2 have the expected effects and 
indicate that Hispanics, married persons, and members of the ‘other’ race/ethnic group 
are less likely to use drugs.  The age and education dummies (not shown) also have the 
expected pattern with older and more educated persons less likely to use drugs.  The 
coefficient of the interaction term indicates a program effect of 9.82 percentage points.  
As a reference point, the Goldberg et al. (2003) study of student athletes estimated a 
deterrence effect of 15 percentage points.   
         The data used here are based on self-reported surveys, which are known to 
understate actual drug use (Bray et al. 1992; Harrison and Hughes, 1997).  However, the 
issue here is the relative underreporting in the NHSDA and DHS surveys.  The main 
difference between them is that military personnel are responding to a workplace survey. 
Cook, Bernstein, and Andrews (1997) claim that underreporting on workplace drug 
surveys can be particularly high. The authors compare the results of self-reports and 
urinalysis tests of employees at a single manufacturing plant.  Their data show that while 
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self-reported illicit drug use rates are 9.4%, rates based on urinalysis tests are only 7.8% 
suggesting that overreporting, not underreporting, is the problem.  However, the authors 
compute what they consider the ‘true’ prevalence rate by adding all self-reported users to 
those who tested positive on the urinalysis but who failed to self-report usage.  This 
yields a ‘true’ drug use rate of 14.2%, leading them to conclude that underreporting in 
workplace settings is about 50%. 
This conclusion, however, is marred by some inconsistencies in their method.  For 
users who tested positive but who did not self-report, they accept the results of the 
urinalysis; on the other hand, for those who tested negative on the urinalysis, they accept 
the individual’s self-report in lieu of the urinalysis result.  Second, the authors compare 
individuals tested via urinalysis with those tested via hair analysis, which are not 
comparable testing methods.  When these inconsistencies are eliminated, the true 
prevalence rate in their data is 11.3%, suggesting underreporting of about 20%. 
Because the authors examine various interview techniques to obtain the self-
reported rates, and two types of laboratory tests, it is difficult to accept their conclusion 
that the true rate is 14.2% (compared to the self-reported rate of 9.4%).  Moreover, the 
underreporting they observe is likely to exist in both the DHS and the NHSDA and, 
therefore, their evidence cannot be considered conclusive on the relative measurement 
error in the two surveys.  Harrison (1997, p. 30) surveys validation studies and concludes 
that “at this point, it is not possible to judge how validly individuals report their drug use 
in surveys.” Despite the lack of evidence on underreporting in the two drug surveys, to 
allow for the possibility of differences in self-reporting in the DHS, we estimate the 
deterrence effects with and without an adjustment for underreporting.  We account for 
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underreporting by reducing the difference-in-difference program effect by 20%, the lower 
figure from the Cook, Bernstein, and Andrews (1997) study, which yields an adjusted 
deterrence effect of 7.88 points.  This adjustment creates a lower-bound estimate of the 
deterrence effect. 
The approach above uses the entire civilian workforce as the comparison group.  
One problem with this approach is that some civilian NHSDA respondents work in 
industries that routinely apply drug testing.  Unfortunately, we have little specific 
information on the type or extent of drug testing policies by broad industry category.  It is 
known, however, that drug testing is more widespread in the transportation industry 
therefore we experimented by omitting respondents in the transportation industry from 
the civilian sample.  This alteration had very little effect on the basic difference-in-
difference estimates.6 
 
III. BENEFITS OF ZERO TOLERANCE 
The benefits of a workplace drug prevention program hinge on the gain in worker 
productivity when the program successfully reduces drug abuse.  Monetizing benefits 
first requires estimates of worker productivity losses due to drug use.  Prior studies that 
have analyzed productivity differences between drug-using and drug-free employees 
have produced conflicting results.  Some studies have discovered a link between drug use 
and degraded performance, which has been attributed to greater absenteeism, reduced job 
performance, higher accident and injury rates, greater use of medical benefits, and lower 
job retention (Zwerling, et al., 1992; Martin, et al., 1994).  However, the methodologies 
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and conclusions of many of these studies have been challenged (Horgan, 1990), and the 
National Academy of Sciences could find no clear evidence that drug use reduces safety 
or other job performance indicators (Normand, 1994, p. 107). 
To estimate productivity losses in the military associated with drug consumption 
we assess the responses to questions in the DHS on the negative job consequences of 
drug or alcohol use.7  An index of work days lost due to drug use was constructed based 
on five questions in the DHS.  The questions record the number of times the respondent 
was late to work, left work early, was hurt in an accident, was absent from work, or 
performed below normal due to drug use.  Each response was weighted by the number of 
days, or portion of a day, assumed to be lost for each reported incident and summed to 
create the annual number of days lost per drug-using worker.8  For the sample, the 
average number of days lost annually due to drug use was 9.15 (or 3.7% of annual work 
days) per drug-using worker.9   
Because of considerable evidence in the literature of comorbidity between drugs 
and alcohol (Martin et al. 1994) the measure of days lost due solely to drug use may 
understate the true amount of lost output.  To allow for comorbidity we create a second 
estimate of output loss by adding work days lost due to alcohol use to the previous index 
(using the same weighting scheme).  The average combined number of days lost due to 
both alcohol and drugs per drug-using worker was 23.12 (or 9.2% of annual work 
days).10  These two ‘productivity degradation’ factors – 3.7% and 9.2% -- establish the 
range used below to perform partial sensitivity analyses of the impact of productivity 
losses on net benefits.  
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A range of degradation estimates is needed due to the inherent uncertainty of the 
true performance loss in the military.  As pointed out above, numerous studies have 
found no evidence of damages due to workplace drug use in civilian firms.  On the other 
hand, the Navy is not comparable to private firms.  One difference is that safety is an 
important issue in the daily operation of ships, aircraft, and submarines and the associated 
weapons and nuclear power systems.  Military personnel also handle classified material.  
Furthermore, due to the importance of team production in the military, absenteeism and 
degraded performance will affect overall unit performance and readiness.  These full 
effects are difficult to evaluate but are assumed to be bracketed by the range of losses 
established by the two productivity degradation indexes. 
A.  Monetary Benefits of Detecting Drug Users.   
 To derive indicators of the costs avoided by deterring and detecting drug users, 
we first estimate average earnings per enlisted person.  Information on the 5,416 Navy 
enlisted personnel detected and dismissed due to non-medical drug use in 1999 was 
obtained from the Defense Manpower Data Center (DMDC).  We assume that detected 
personnel represent a sample of the target population of the military’s drug policy, which 
allows us to use the grade distribution of detected service members to calculate weighted 
average annual earnings for all enlisted personnel.  The earnings measure includes base 
pay, and allowances for housing and subsistence. Weighted average annual earnings in 
1999 were $22,745.  Multiplying the productivity degradation factors by average annual 
earnings yields the per person losses from drug use (and the costs avoided from 
successful prevention).  Annual per person output losses are valued at $841 for the lower 
bound degradation factor and $2,092 for the upper bound.11 
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In 1999 there were 314,272 Navy enlisted personnel, of whom 5,416 (1.7%) were 
detected and terminated for failing the urinalysis test.  This number represents gross 
detections, but we must use net detections by adjusting for the number of replacements 
who themselves will be drug users.  We assume that the prevalence rate among new 
recruits is four percent, about one point lower than the overall Navy prevalence rate of 
five percent.  This yields 5,199 net detected members.  Annual benefits to the Navy of 
detecting and terminating 5,199 drug users in 1999 range from $4.37 million under the 
low degradation factor to $10.87 million under the high degradation factor. 
B.  Monetary Benefits of Deterring Potential Drug Users.   
Since 5% of Navy personnel used drugs in 1995, the estimated deterrence effect of 
9.82 points implies that the prevalence rate would have been 14.86 percentage points in 
the absence of the program, and that 30,987 potential users were deterred annually.  The 
product of the number of deterred personnel and the costs avoided per person yields 
annual deterrence benefits of $26.07 million and $64.84 million for the low and high 
degradation factors, respectively. Panel A of Table 3 summarizes gross benefits to the 
Navy, which range from $25.21 million under the low degradation/low deterrence 
combination (column 4), to $75.71 million under the high deterrence/high degradation 
combination (col. 2).  It is noteworthy that the benefits associated with deterrence far 
outweigh the benefits generated by detecting current users.12 
IV. THE COST OF DRUG TESTING AND ZERO TOLERANCE 
The primary cost component of a zero tolerance policy is the cost of replacing 
individuals dismissed for failing a urinalysis test.  The primary approach for estimating 
the replacement cost of those dismissed for being drug-positive in 1999 is to assume that 
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replacements are acquired via lateral entry much as they are in private firms.  That is, a 
dismissed worker is replaced by simply transferring another worker from a lower grade 
or from a different occupation at the same grade.  This approach may not accurately 
characterize the military’s internal labor market in which there is not lateral entry and all 
hiring is at the entry point.  For example, it does not account for the impact of annual 
attrition.  Nonetheless, it is useful in the cost-benefit analysis (CBA) to generate a lower-
bound estimate of replacement costs and a ‘best-case’ scenario for the drug program.   
To estimate replacement costs per new accession we used the DMDC data on 
those dismissed by the Navy in 1999, disaggregated by pay grade, tenure, and military 
occupation. Per person training and recruiting costs were taken from the Navy’s 
Manpower Cost Estimating Model. Training and recruiting costs for individuals in 
designated military occupations range from $7,151 for the Counselor occupation to 
$46,067 for an Electrician’s Mate.  For recruits with no occupation, per person cost is 
$6,858; for apprentices with no occupation but who completed advanced training, cost is 
$21,950.  For all others we use average Navy-wide replacement costs of $17,344.13  Total 
replacement costs are the product of the number of required new accessions and the cost 
per accession.  Under the lateral entry replacement assumption the cost of replacing Navy 
personnel dismissed in 1999 under zero tolerance is $71.1 million.   
Direct program costs include medical labs, salaries of program employees, and 
other administrative costs. In 1999 the Navy spent $17.5 million to administer the drug-
testing program.14  In addition, each service member is tested 2.4 times a year on average, 
which generates lost work time.  Lost output from the testing process is obtained by 
multiplying the 2.4 tests per person by the time to take the test (10 minutes) and then by 
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the size of the work force.  The total time loss is roughly 52,379 hours. Using an average 
hourly wage (based on 250 annual work days) of $11.37, lost output from the testing 
process is valued at $1.4 million. Total program costs thus range from $90.6 million to 
$196 million, depending on the replacement assumption. 
Table 3 summarizes gross benefits (panel A, total costs (panel B), and net benefits 
(panel C).  Under all estimated parameters, the program generates net economic losses.  
The losses are the smallest ($14.89 million) when the impact of drug use on productivity 
and the deterrence effect are high.  At the other extreme, when the lowest values of 
degradation and deterrence are used losses are as high as $65.39 million.  The partial 
sensitivity analysis in Table 3 indicates that net losses are robust to variations in the key 
parameters. Another way to view these results is to calculate the required level of a given 
parameter for the program to breakeven.  Breakeven degradation factors are .11 
(assuming high deterrence) and .15 (assuming low deterrence). 
V. CONCLUSIONS 
Computing the welfare gains of a zero tolerance policy in a comprehensive 
manner requires numerous assumptions.  While these calculations have inherent 
limitations, we find that for reasonable parameter values there are welfare losses from a 
zero tolerance policy.  If a program yields substantial net benefits using worst case 
assumptions, the program can be recommended even in the face of considerable 
uncertainty about the exact magnitude of the benefits.  In this case, however, the 
military’s drug program generates positive net benefits only when key parameters are 
implausibly high.  Even a productivity degradation factor of .11 exceeds our upper-bound 
estimate of .092, which itself is likely to overstate the true productivity losses associated 
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with drug use in the Navy.  The fact that private firms are able to adjust wages to reflect 
the damages imposed by drug abusers, but that prior studies of private sector wages have 
not detected a consistent pattern of reduced wages for drug users suggests that damages 
imposed by drug use in the workplace may be closer to, or below, our lower-bound 
degradation factor (.037).   
 The negative net benefits in this study suggest that the considerable resources 
devoted to drug prevention in the military could be reallocated to other prevention efforts 
such as counseling, rehabilitation, or education.15  Prior to 1981 the Navy referred drug 
abusers to rehabilitation and the available evidence suggests that treatment programs 
were cost-effective.16 Indeed, rehabilitation normally will be more cost-effective than a 
zero tolerance policy because a major portion of the benefits of rehabilitation are avoided 
replacement costs.  Decision makers also may maximize net benefits by selecting a 
combination of policies, which might include a ‘two- or three-strikes’ option along with 
rehabilitation. 
Even though the drug prevention program yields net economic losses, decision 
makers may be willing to accept them if other, non-quantifiable benefits are sizeable or 
highly valued.  For example, analysts have pointed out that in organizations such as the 
military and law enforcement, drug testing enhances the public’s trust and support for the 
organization (Felman and Petrini 1988).  Greater public support can enhance the 
organization’s effectiveness and its ability to successfully achieve its goals.  Secondly, 
the military is a highly visible organization that may serve as a role model for youth, 
which may generate external social benefits from its drug policy. 
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There are, on the other hand, non-quantifiable costs of zero tolerance that also 
must be weighed and that are not internalized by military decision makers. For example, 
drug screening will likely reduce the number of qualified military applicants who are 
non-users, as well as those who are users, because potential applicants may wish to avoid 
the invasion of privacy and mis-trust implied by random drug testing.  Also, there may be 
a loss of reputation and future civilian employability of individuals simply because they 
failed a urinalysis test.   
Furthermore, Cowan (1987) claims that the recovery rate in employer-sponsored 
treatment programs is between 60% and 90% for alcohol and drug abusers if the worker 
remains employed, but is only 5% if the individual becomes unemployed.  This suggests 
that a zero tolerance policy that fires a drug-positive worker not only creates an 
unemployed worker who may receive unemployment insurance and who may be less 
employable, but also by not referring the worker to treatment may prolong the worker’s 
drug or alcohol problem thus imposing secondary social costs. 
 This study represents a first effort to estimate the economic value of workplace 
drug programs.  The estimates should be considered provisional as additional research is 
needed to improve the estimates of the key parameters that are so crucial to total program 
benefits.  It is hoped that our paper narrows the range bracketing the true deterrence 
effect and productivity degradation factors.  We argue that the true size of these 
parameters lie closer to the low end of the range estimated reported here, but it remains 
for future researchers to identify these effects more precisely and to confirm whether net 
social costs can be expected in other workplaces.17 
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Military Civilian  
Before After Before After 
Past month drug use 0.195 0.025 0.322 0.146 
Past year drug use 
 
0.389 0.056 0.424 0.234 
Married 0.486 0.647 0.369 0.357 
African-American 0.179 0.176 0.103 0.214 
Hispanic 0.050 0.092 0.055 0.300 
Other race/ethnicity 0.029 0.071 0.031 0.028 
High school diploma 0.444 0.378 0.334 0.352 
Some college 0.303 0.513 0.254 0.201 
College diploma 0.088 0.073 0.074 0.089 
Ages 17-20 0.270 0.119 0.324 0.243 
Ages 21-25 0.327 0.259 0.290 0.222 
Ages 26-34 0.195 0.248 0.189 0.361 
Ages 35-49  0.206 0.378 0.195 0.173 
 
Number of observations 10,358 10,143 1,702 3,933 
     









































Notes: N=39,640; standard errors in 
parentheses.  
Dependent variable is the probability of drug 
participation in last year. Regressions also 
include three age dummies and three 
education dummies. 
a Implied probability effect. 
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                                                                                    Degradation Factor 
                                                          ________________________________________ 
  
                                                            Low a               High b               Low a               High b 
    
A.  Gross Benefits 
     a. High Deterrence c                        30.44               75.71                 - -                       - -  
     b. Low Deterrence d                            - -                 - -                    25.21                62.68 
  
B.  Total Cost                                       90.6                 90.6                 90.6                 90.6 
  




            Notes: a Low degradation factor = -.037 
                        b High degradation factor = -.092 
                        c Low deterrence effect = +7.88 pts. 









        
Appendix Table.  Net Benefit Sensitivity Analysis 
   Degradation Factor 
   0 0.037 0.092 0.12 0.15 0.18 
0 (196.0) (191.8) (185.6) (182.4) (179.0) (175.6) 
2 (196.0) (186.5) (172.4) (165.3) (157.6) (149.9) 
4 (196.0) (181.2) (159.3) (148.1) (136.1) (124.1) 
6 (196.0) (176.0) (146.1) (130.9) (114.7) (98.4) 
8 (196.0) (170.7) (133.0) (113.8) (93.2) (72.7) 
10 (196.0) (165.4) (119.8) (96.6) (71.8) (46.9) 
12 (196.0) (160.1) (106.7) (79.5) (50.3) (21.2) 
14 (196.0) (154.8) (93.5) (62.3) (28.9) 4.5 
16 (196.0) (149.5) (80.4) (45.2) (7.4) 30.3 















20 (196.0) (138.9) (54.1) (10.9) 35.4 81.7 
        
 
                                                          
1 A recent survey found that 50 percent of large U.S. firms test current employees, and 60 percent test job 
applicants (AMA, 2001).  Macdonald and Wells (1994) survey eight types of drug testing programs. 
2 The Omnibus Transportation Employee Testing Act of 1991 requires employers in the transportation 
industry to test all workers who hold safety-sensitive jobs. 
3 Both civilian and military workers are equally subject to state laws governing illegal substance possession 
and use. 
4 Illicit drug use peaked in 1979 and started to decline after 1981 (Harwood et al. 1998).  
5 Martinez (1998) surveys the evolution of the four service’s drug policies. 
6 Note that using the all-industry civilian comparison group may not be a serious flaw.  While some civilian 
workers face drug testing of some type, few face the frequent random testing imposed by the military, and 
virtually none face a zero tolerance policy (see Macdonald and Wells, 1994).  To the extent that some 
members of the comparison group are tested the regression estimates will understate the deterrence effect.  
This is acceptable given that our goal is to create a conservative estimate of the deterrence effect. 
7 If firms can shift the costs imposed by drug-using employees, hedonic wage studies would provide useful 
information on productivity losses from worker drug use.  Unfortunately, a large literature that has used 
this approach has found widely varying results, including a positive relationship between drug use and 
wages (French, et al., 1998 survey this literature).  Note that if firms can shift the costs of drug use to 
workers in the form of lower wages, there is little incentive to use drug tests.  Drug testing is efficient only 
if drug abusers impose external costs, productivity is hard to measure, or wages cannot be adjusted for 
individual productivity differences.  Administrative wage setting is one reason drug testing may be efficient 
in the military. 
8 Each incident of tardiness, leaving work early, and performing below normal was weighted by .25 days; 
each absence was weighted by 1.0; and, an injury was weighted by 5.0 days. 
9 DiNardo (1994) points out that if employers pay workers the value of their marginal products, a worker’s 
decision to miss work is fully internalized via a lower wage (so long as absenteeism does not create 
negative externalities).  As noted above administrative wage setting prevents military wages from adjusting 
to marginal changes in work effort and absenteeism.  Moreover, absenteeism is likely to generate 
externalities in the military’s team production environment, which increases military manpower 
expenditures and reduces unit production. 
10 By way of comparison, Ippolito (1996) found that the wage discount for government workers with 
excessive absences or tardiness is about 7 percent, which is near the middle of our range of lost output 
estimates.   
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11 For comparison purposes we use other sources to calculate alternative estimates of the value of lost 
productivity per drug user.  In 1992 there were an estimated 11.4 million civilian illicit drug users over age 
12. Adjusting for the number of users between ages 12 and 18 and the number of unemployed, there were 
roughly 10 million employed adult drug users.  Harwood, et al. (1998) estimate total annual U.S. 
productivity losses of $14.2 billion in 1992, which yields a per worker loss in 1992 of $1,420 ($1,604 in 
1999 dollars).  This estimate falls near the top of our range of degradation factors.  Harwood, et al. also 
estimate the annual earnings loss per drug dependent worker to be $2,352 in 1992 ($2,657 in 1999 dollars), 
which exceeds the top of our range. 
12 The number of users detected is smaller than the number deterred because the probability of detection is 
fairly low.  Borack (1995; 1997) demonstrates that the expected time until detection ranges from one year 
to as high as ten years for a ‘non-gaming’ user and even longer for a ‘gaming’ user. 
13 Estimates of per worker turnover costs in private firms also vary widely.  A recent survey reported 15 
different estimates of turnover costs for a typical worker (earning $16,000 annually): the range in costs is 
from $3,500 to $25,000.  In private firms direct costs include some training costs, but most firms deliver 
only specific training.  By contrast, the military delivers extensive general training, which boosts costs. 
(See “Employee Turnovers Costs, 2003,” http://www.sashacorp.com/turncost.html). 
14 Data provided by Navy Bureau of Personnel, Drug Detection and Deterrence Branch. 
15 About one-third of Fortune 500 companies have set up employee assistance programs (EAP) that refer 
drug abusing employees to treatment programs (Felman and Petrini 1988). 
16 Devine et al. (1989) obtained a benefit-cost ratio of 12:1 for the Navy’s alcohol rehabilitation program 
despite the fact that only about 50 percent of participants were successfully rehabilitated. 
17 Whether the conclusions here apply to private firms is questionable.  Damages imposed by drug use may 
be less when safety is not an overriding issue.  On the other hand, private companies may face greater legal 
liability for damages imposed by drug-using employees. 
 
